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Introduction: Vulnerability Studies
Growing awareness of organised environmental crime
has led to a political demand for more effective action.
Although sometimes described as victimless crimes, en-
vironmental crimes are more correctly thought of as un-
known crimes, since victims may be unaware of the de-
crease in quality of life from illegal dumping (or, in the
case of generations as yet unborn, unable to complain).
Police agencies and criminal justice systems may have
more pressing priorities, so that action may be desultory,
and data collected may fail to capture the underlying risks.
Specialised regulatory agencies sometimes put more ef-
fort into soft persuasion
than tough action. Informa-
tion from inspections and
discussions with economic
operators is not made avail-
able in detail. Even if in-
spectors saw and knew eve-
rything (which they do not
and cannot), it would still
not be any part of their job
to put detailed information
into the public realm. This
article focuses on the eco-
nomic sector of which the
main activity can be consid-
ered as “waste manage-
ment” – the collection,
transport and treatment of
waste – and explores its particular crime opportunities.1
From what sources, then, can information be gained
about criminal opportunities in the waste management
businesses? This article reports on a method of scanning
economic sectors for vulnerabilities; that is, for potential
points of victimisation.
Method for assessment of vulnerability of sectors
Criminal behaviour always takes place within a con-
text. The project MAVUS, which stands for Method for
Assessment of Vulnerability of Sectors,2 deploys a method
to measure the vulnerability of economic sectors to or-
ganised crime. MAVUS observes contexts, scanning for
vulnerabilities (context-specific opportunities that might
be exploited by some and could lead to crime or irregu-
larities). From such a vantage point, it may sometimes be
possible to take action to close off loopholes and reduce
crime in the corporate context – an aspect of good gov-
ernance that is appreciated by at least the larger waste
management firms. In a study conducted at Gent Univer-
sity in Belgium and funded by the European Commission
in 2006, this method was applied to municipal and bulk
waste management processes, hazardous waste manage-
ment, and nuclear waste management.
In applying the MAVUS system, information gather-
ing takes place at three levels.3 First, the sector and its
markets are described. Second, the broader environment
– the various contexts of the
sector – are pictured. These
contexts include the regula-
tory context, enforcement
measures in place, the fi-
nancial, legal and social en-
vironments of the business,
and criminals around and
within the industry.4 Third,
an analysis is carried out at
the level of waste manage-
ment enterprises, resulting
in a “Reference Model”,
distilling out common fea-
tures.5 By describing these
three levels – sector, envi-
ronment and business struc-
tures and processes – the
stage is set for the identification of vulnerabilities that may
open up the sector to organised crime.
Why is such a method interesting? First, it takes into
account the economic reality, both on a broad and a nar-
row level, in which crimes takes place. It pays attention to
the causes of crime within the context of legitimate eco-
nomic structures and activities. Second, as it does not rely
on official crime data, it does not import or reproduce the
blind spots of those data. Third, it does not focus solely on
the past, but considers current trends within the context,
in order to anticipate so far unrecognised and unreported
crime risks.
The Limits of Regulation: Gaps and
Incoherencies
Legislation has been adopted in several international
bodies and regional institutions, for example the United
Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). The scope
of these measures differs, as both the environmental and
the economic/social/judicial framework are taken into
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account. On a UN level, the United Nations Environment
Programme6 and the Basel Convention7 influence the glo-
bal waste management in various ways. The Convention
attempts to prevent situations in which developing coun-
tries effectively become huge landfill sites for industrial-
ised countries. Of course, the engagement of developing
countries is necessary for its implementation, and the Con-
vention is currently also faced with various levels of op-
position8 and other difficulties including specifically a lack
of resources.9
For policy reasons, it is necessary to define and clas-
sify waste. In the EU, this definition was established in
the 1975 Council Directive on Waste (since amended).10
The key issue in the waste definition is “discarding or the
intention or requirement to discard”.11 The Directive leaves
room for interpretation, through the evolution of political
attention, technical possibilities and opening of new mar-
kets for recovery and disposal operations. In the mean-
time, a set of legislative measures has been taken to fur-
ther regulate various areas of the waste management in-
dustry: hazardous waste,12 waste statistics,13 waste ship-
ments14 and landfill reduction,15 as well as more specific
issues, such as incineration,16 waste from electrical and
electronic equipment (WEEE),17 end-of-life vehicles,18 and
more.
Waste regulations cover most aspects of waste man-
agement; however, there are some blind spots. One of these
is the area of “waste brokerage”. This practice has come
into being to help the trade to cope with the growing costs
of stricter environmental regulations.19 However, as legis-
lation of the possession of waste may not, under some
laws, apply to brokers (although they have to fulfil licenc-
ing conditions), waste does not legally become their prop-
erty, hence they escape some legislative requirements.20,21
Being loosely regulated experts in the subject matter, bro-
kers are in a position to help firms to exploit gaps in regu-
lation.
Internationally, the body of legislation and implement-
ing rules is not neat and tidy: there are national differ-
ences concerning waste classifications;22 indistinctions
between waste and related materials (such as digging sites
and soil regulations);23 scope for honest confusion between
the reuse of second-hand goods, on the one hand, and re-
cycling24 on the other; and problems in defining liability
for environmental crimes.25 These difficulties are not new.
The EU 2006 Directive26 brings together and updates the
previously dispersed legislative framework on waste, but
it does not resolve all the problems.
Contextual Limits?
Implementation of regulations
National implementation of the waste-related legal
framework differs from country to country.27 The EU Di-
rective creates only a set of minimum rules, and allows
EU member states to go further. International companies
must therefore be aware of the individual regulations within
each of the countries in which they operate. By 2003, how-
ever, twelve EU countries had established a national waste
management plan or strategy.28
The separation of administrative law and criminal law
may hamper environmental crime investigations.29 Admin-
istrative and criminal enforcement bodies often seem to
prioritise different areas of operation: criminal enforce-
ment in this area often focuses on transport of waste, while
administrative controls frequently focus primarily on ac-
tivities at static sites. Bottlenecks are encountered during
the investigation and control, but also during prosecution
and trial.30
Environmental crimes are considered by some to be
victimless crimes, because specific individual victims are
usually not distinguishable for each specific event. The
actual victims or affected persons often may not even know
of the impacts that they are experiencing. This lack of
knowledge clearly reduces the scope for complaints. En-
vironmental crimes are often discovered by accident, or
not discovered until long after the fact. From that perspec-
tive, criminal law enforcement agencies are in a difficult
position. They are not designed to cope with the complex-
ity, ideology and dynamics of environmental regulations.31
An additional difficulty is finding a balance between pe-
nalising companies and penalising employees.32
Administrative bodies also face enforcement obstacles.
In most cases, they both issue permits and impose permit
conditions and are also responsible for enforcing compli-
ance with those conditions. Their procedures, which op-
erate less formally, may be vulnerable to charges of im-
proper decision-making or even corruption.
Perhaps most important, both penal and administra-
tive controls are oriented nationally. However, globalisa-
tion has opened up opportunities for waste disposal crime
as an international business.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are increas-
ingly engaged in these issues; for example, the European
Environmental Bureau aims at sustainable development
and monitors the workings of the legislation.33 Other bod-
ies and associations, situated in the economic field, in-
clude the national federations and the European Federa-
tion of Waste Management and Environmental Services
(FEAD). These actors have their own interests to look af-
ter, making their possible influence as controlling bodies
unclear.
Waste as a vulnerable product
The risks of crime arising from commercial markets
vary according to the type of product.34 Product-related
vulnerabilities within the waste industry can be distin-
guished for various reasons. For example, waste is a prod-
uct with an inelastic price, and thus an attractive target for
organised crime. In particular conditions, it could result
in price fixing, as has been the case in the past in New
York.35 Although the modus operandi consisted of brib-
ery, racketeering,36 deceit and illegal dumping,37 the huge
profits made would not have been possible if the market
had been an open, competitive one.
Similarly, the quality, physical nature and appearance
of waste streams can be manipulated, so deception be-
comes possible when transferring waste to third parties,
who may, in good faith, accept the waste for disposal.
Hazardous wastes can easily be mixed with non-hazard-
ous wastes. Due to the situation with so-called mirror en-
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tries,38 this provides opportunities to mask hazardous waste
proportions. These mirror entries define certain waste
streams as hazardous only when their concentration in liq-
uids exceeds a certain level. By keeping the hazardous
waste gradations under legal limits, collection, transport
and treatment become less regulated.
Legislative measures take these product-related
vulnerabilities into account, to some extent. However, this
does not mean these vulnerabilities have been neutralised.
Continuing loopholes could be blocked – for example, the
manipulation of waste streams could be tackled by increas-
ing the frequency of sampling. Overall, effective waste
management can save money in the long term, by reduc-
ing the cost of clean-up operations.
Vulnerabilities of the economic sector
Every entrepreneur, whether his activities are legal or
illegal, must be able to meet certain market conditions if
he intends his products or services
to enter the legal market39 – not
only legal thresholds, but also prac-
tical and economic requirements.
In assessing the sector
vulnerabilities, heterogeneity may
be the most striking characteristic
of the waste management industry.
A distinction can be made between
the different stages of waste man-
agement: collection, transport and
treatment. The last factor, treat-
ment, alone constitutes several ac-
tivities, including reuse, recycling,
incineration without energy recov-
ery, incineration with energy re-
covery and landfill. The value of
waste, therefore, is not intrinsic,
but depends on how it can be proc-
essed.
The growth and internationali-
sation of markets and competition
has provided opportunities for
criminals to enter the waste dis-
posal business. Notable variations in the extent of privati-
sation also exist. Levels of privatisation have grown con-
siderably in the past decades. In most EU member states,
privatisation is higher in the treatment stage than in the
collection stage. This is particularly the case in Germany
and the UK, where treatment privatisation is above 80 per
cent, while private waste collection is limited to, respec-
tively, 60 per cent and 35 per cent. In Scandinavian coun-
tries, however, this trend is reversed. Finland’s waste man-
agement is characterised by 100 per cent private waste
collection, but only around 5 per cent of its treatment is
privatised.40 The principles of proximity and self-suffi-
ciency may also conflict with the principles of economic
efficiency,41 particularly where facilities are near national
borders. Because of laws seeking national self-sufficiency,
companies may be required to travel further to fulfil their
legislative obligations. All these factors may create incen-
tives to become involved in illegal waste management, in
order to cope with fierce and growing levels of competi-
tion.
The formal economic requirements for entering the
bulk and local waste management markets are relatively
modest. Waste management can be performed within a
small company and no minimal financial requirements are
set. Yet, informal barriers exist and have been growing
over time. The number of stable and regular business con-
tacts needed for success has increased, due to the com-
petitiveness of the market. This reduces the ability of other
entities to enter the market, unless they engage the serv-
ices of waste brokers. Although their role remains unclear
and their qualifications vague (see above), brokers are also
gatekeepers to the sector for possible new entrants; their
vulnerability should not be overlooked.
Although the market is well suited to small compa-
nies, however, its potential profitability has made it a tar-
get for a large degree of merger activity, resulting42 in
market concentration, a small club
of companies accounting for most
of the market share, putting com-
petitive pressure on small play-
ers.43 Despite the absence of mini-
mum requirements in legislation,
higher investments are required in
terms of capital, technology and
staff, as a result of the enhanced
focus on environmentally sound
development. Criminals thereby
find more and more opportunities
to cut corners behind the front of a
legal waste management company.
Legal and illegal waste man-
agement sectors can be connected
in several ways. The legal sector
may become the victim, the
facilitator, or even the beneficiary
of illegal waste management.44 The
creation of a recognised quality la-
bel would certainly be welcomed
by legal companies, as they would
see the level of fairness in compe-
tition increase. A minimum financial standard would have
the additional advantage that, in case of environmental
crime, the clean-up costs could be borne by the polluter,
not by the taxpayer.
Beyond legality
Available estimates indicate that profits from illegal
waste management are about three to four times higher
than those for legal activities.45 For hazardous wastes, the
profit differential is even higher.46 It is possible that com-
mercial entities’ creative cost reduction beyond what is
allowed is encouraged by these factors and that corporate
culture considers the environment less important than prof-
its. Beyond this, the growing use of subcontractors may
decrease transparency, reducing the risks of detection of
illegal waste management practices.
It is not only companies which commit environmental
crimes. Some waste management is carried out by the pro-
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ducers of waste, often the general public. Waste-related
crime committed by citizens probably accounts for a con-
siderably lower amount.47 This proportion is not consid-
ered within the scope of this article, but should not be
forgotten.
In addition to waste management by citizens, two other
alternative waste-related markets can be distinguished.
First, the second-hand market is often used as a cover for
international waste shipments to Third World countries.48
This has been made possible because of different living
standards and formal requirements. As a legal – or semi-
legal – alternative, this provides opportunities to avoid
application of waste management regulations.49 Although
strictly not illegal, the trademark of “second-hand goods”
is often used or abused, making it an important focal point
and a vulnerable aspect. Current controls on end-of-life
products50 are not sufficient to stop market abuse.
Maximisation of the pool of recovered and recycled ma-
terials may require further legislative and regulative
changes.51 Similar abuse of the cover of “recycling” oc-
curs in the area of ship-breaking, where developing coun-
tries become the dumping grounds for shipwrecks from
all over the globe.52
Second, a substantial black market exists. From that
perspective, a line can be drawn between improper ac-
tions in relation to waste itself and, on the other hand, the
use of commercial structures in the waste industry to com-
mit other crimes. In the first case, the purpose may be to
illegally get rid of waste in the cheapest possible way, to
make as much profit as possible.53 In the second case, the
waste sector may be used to commit financial crimes (for
example, tax evasion). In some cases, the two aspects are
combined.54 For reasons of space, here we focus on the
first of these.
Waste management constitutes a legal activity, under-
taken by specialised waste management companies or
general manufacturing companies. Due to the hidden na-
ture of environmental crime, it is not always clear at what
stage the transition from legal to illegal has occurred. For
example, this transition might occur during national or
international transport, where the company may cut cor-
ners relating to the factors listed above. Another is that
waste could become illegal owing to the manner in which
it is stored or dumped. In Italy, almost one-third of spe-
cialised waste is disposed of illegally.55 Criminal organi-
sations have complex relationships with corporations,
businessmen and (local) authorities, affected by the grow-
ing demand for cheaper services, the business ethic of some
industry segments, low public awareness, and delay in
policy implementation.56 The physical impact of this be-
haviour on local populations is considerable: in the so-
called “triangle of death” (formed by Nora, Marigliano
and Acerra), people suffer from considerably higher rates
of cancer, leukaemia and lymphoma.57
The drivers behind all environmental black markets
are threefold: substantial cost or value differentials, regu-
latory failures, and failure of enforcement.58 Countries and
regions most vulnerable to corporate crime are character-
ised by a weak economy, low wages, inefficient controls
and poorly paid (and sometimes desperate) local officials.59
As applied to waste-related crime, these factors are all
generally present. Both relative deprivation and transport-
ing possibilities have grown. Increased mobility has aug-
mented the possibilities for transporting waste to Third
World countries. Although the Basel Convention has con-
siderably reduced the licit possibilities to engage in the
so-called “waste colonialism”,60 unstable political situa-
tions reduce both the number of controls and their effec-
tiveness. Differences among national financial standards
create opportunities to corrupt local law enforcement of-
ficers. Until proper international cooperation between in-
dustrialised and developing countries has been established,
political and economical differences will provide oppor-
tunities for international (illegal) waste transport and
dumping.
Conclusion
Waste-related crime remains an important political is-
sue. Regulatory, enforcement and industry data on known
events have generally not been made public, and the abil-
ity to assess waste-related crime is consequently limited.
Like an iceberg, most waste-related crime issue lies be-
neath the surface. This article has explored a number of
the vulnerabilities of the waste management sector, which
may open the door for high levels of criminal activity.
Our general conclusion is that some of these
vulnerabilities could be reduced, if policy makers paid
more attention to issues such as national differences of
waste definitions, liability issues, international coopera-
tion, waste brokers, and the relationship between admin-
istrative and penal law. From a technical point of view, it
might be possible to make it more difficult to mix certain
waste streams. Finally, efforts are required to weed out
criminal waste management companies that use legal com-
panies as a “front”. Crime policy and the prospects for
prevention cannot be separated from environmental policy,
economic policy and good governance.
References
1 Van Daele, S., Dorn, N. and Vander Beken, T., The European waste disposal
sector, study (JLS/2005/AGIS/064), to be published under the AGIS programme
of the European Commission.
2 Vander Beken, T., ed., Organised crime and vulnerability of economic sec-
tors: The European transport and music sector, Antwerp, Maklu, 2005.
3 Vander Beken, T., Defruytier, M., Bucquoye, A. and Verpoest, K., Road map
for vulnerability studies, in: Organised crime and vulnerability of economic sec-
tors: The European transport and music sector, Vander Beken, T. (ed.), Antwerp,
Maklu, 2005, 7–56.
4 Smith, D., Paragons, pariahs and pirates: a spectrum-based theory of enter-
prise, Crime and Delinquency 26 (1980), 358–386.
5 Scholze-Reiter, B. and Stickel, E., eds, Business process modelling, Berlin,
Springer, 1996.
6 United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP Annual Report 2005, United
Nations, 2006.
7 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, United Nations – Treaty Series 1673 (1992), I-
28911, 126–161.
8 Chasek, P., Earth negotiations: analysing thirty years of environmental di-
plomacy, Tokyo, United Nations University, 2001, 110–116.
9 Brack, D., The growth and control of international environmental crime, En-
vironmental Health Perspectives 112 (2004), 80–81.
10 Council Directive 75/442/EEC on waste, Official Journal L194, 25/07/1975,
39–41.
11 Art. 1 of the Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 amending
Directive 75/442/EEC on waste, Official Journal L078, 26/03/1991, 32.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, 37/1 (2007)38
0378-777X/07/$17.00 © 2007 IOS Press
12 Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste,
Official Journal L377, 31/12/1991, 20–27.
13 Regulation (EC) No 2150/2002 of the European parliament and the council
of 25 November 2002 on waste statistics, Official Journal L332, 9/12/2002, 1–36.
14 Council Regulation (EEC 259/93) on the supervision and control of ship-
ments of waste within, into and out of the European Community, Official Journal
L030/1, 06/02/1993, 1–28.
15 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, Of-
ficial Journal L182, 16/07/1999, 1–19.
16 Directive 2000/76/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 4
December 2000 on the incineration of waste, Official Journal L332, 28/12/2000,
91–122.
17 Directive 2002/96/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 27
January 2003 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), Official Jour-
nal L37, 13/02/2003, 24–38.
18 Directive 2000/53/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 18
September 2000 on end-of-life vehicles, Official Journal L269, 21/10/2000, 34–
42.
19 Wright, S.A. (book review), Dangerous grounds: the world of hazardous waste
crime, Rebovich D.J., Social Science Quarterly 74 (1993), 452–453.
20 Van den Anker, M.J.J. and Snels, W.C.E., Wie betaalt, bepaalt: over
intermediaire organisaties, milieucriminaliteit, organisatiecriminaliteit en integriteit
in het complexe milieuveld, ’s Gravenhage, Elsevier bedrijfsinformatie, 1999, 36–
38.
21 Bruinsma, G., De afvalverwerkingbranche, in: Inzake opsporing:
enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden, Deel II onderzoeksgroep Fijnaut: branches,
Bruinsma, G. and Bovenkerk, F., eds, The Hague, SDU, 1996, 283–284.
22 Ermaroca, F., Community legislation and jurisprudence in the area of waste
management: recent developments, Reciel 7 (1998), 274–282.
23 Amendola, G., Need for a strengthening of criminal environmental law? The
Italian case, in: Environmental crime in Europe: rules of sanctions, Comte, F. and
Krämer, L., eds, Groningen, Europa law publishing, 2004, 177–195.
24 Puckett, J., The Basel plan: a triumph over business-as-usual, Basel action
network, 1997, 4.
25 Bandi, G., Liability and sanctions, criminal liability in Hungary, in: Environ-
mental crime in Europe: rules of sanctions, Comte, F. and Krämer, L., eds,
Groningen, Europa law publishing, 2004, 127–142.
26 Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 5 April 2006 on waste, Official Journal L114, 27/04/2006, 9–21.
27 Lindström, M., Attila, M., Fitch, T. and Pennanen, J., Waste-re-
lated Conditions in Environmental Permits, Amsterdam, IMPEL Eu-
ropean Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of
Environmental Law, 2005.
28 European Environmental Agency, Europe’s environment: the third
assessment, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2003, 162.
29 Faure, M.G. and Heine, G., Criminal Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law in the European Union, The Hague, Kluwer International,
2005, 89–90.
30 Veldkamp, A.M.E., Grensoverschrijdende overbrenging van
afvalstoffen, in: Strafrechtelijke aanpak van grensoverschrijdende
milieucriminaliteit, capita selecta, Hendriks, L.E.M., Biezeveld, G.A.
and Van Rijswick, H.F.M.W., eds, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1996, 56–
58.
31 Fortney, D.C., Thinking outside the “black box” tailored enforce-
ment in environmental criminal law, Texas Law Review 81 (2003),
1609–1635.
32 Earnhart, D., Environmental crime and punishment in the Czech
Republic: penalties against firms and employees, Journal of Compara-
tive Economics 28 (2000), 379–399.
33 Hontelez, J., EEB Work Programme 2006, Brussels, European
Environmental Bureau.
34 Clarke, R.V. and Newman, G., Secured by design: a plan for se-
curity coding of electronic products, Draft produced for the Foresight Crime Pre-
vention Panel by the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, UCL, 2002, 31.
35 Jacobs, J.B., Friel, C. and Radick, R., Gotham unbound: how New York City
was liberated from the grip of organised crime, New York, New York University
Press, 1999, 86–95.
36 Carter, T.S., Ascent of the corporate model in environmental-organised crime,
Crime Law and Social Change 31 (1999), 1–30.
37 Simon, D.R., Corporate environmental crimes and social inequality: new di-
rections for environmental justice research, American Behavioural Scientist 43
(2000), 635.
38 Commission Decision of 3 May 2000 replacing Decision 94/3/EC establish-
ing a list of wastes pursuant to Article 1(a) of Council Directive 75/442/EEC on
waste and Council Decision 94/904/EC establishing a list of hazardous waste pur-
suant to Article 1(4) of Council Directive 91/689/EEC on hazardous waste, Offi-
cial Journal L226, 06/09/2000, 1–32.
39 Levi, M. and Naylor, T., Organised crime, the organisation of crime and the
organisation of business, Paper published by the UK DTI’s Office of Science and
Technology Foresight Directorate Crime Prevention Panel, 2000, 31.
40 Hall, D., Waste management companies in Europe, Public Services Interna-
tional Research Unit, European Federation of Public Service Unions, 2006. See
http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/EN_PSIRU_waste_management_in_EU_
Feb_06.pdf.
41 Buclet, N. and Godard, O., Municipal waste management in Europe: a com-
parison of national regimes, in: Municipal waste management in Europe: a com-
parative study in building regimes, Buclet, N. and Godard, O., eds, Dordrecht,
Kluwer, 2000, 222.
42 Cooke, A., and Chapple, W., Merger activity in the waste disposal industry:
the impact and the implications of the Environmental Protection Act, Applied Eco-
nomics 32 (2000), 749–755.
43 Waste Market Council, Waste market: public companies and developments,
Utrecht, AOO, 2003, 8–9.
44 Vander Beken, T. and Balcaen, A., Crime opportunities provided by legisla-
tion in different sectors, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 2006
(in press).
45 Bruinsma, G., ibid., 266.
46 Szasz, A., Corporations, organised crime and the disposal of hazardous waste:
an examination of the making of a criminogenic regulatory structure, Criminology
24 (1986), 1–27.
47 Situ, Y., Public transgression of environmental law: a preliminary study, De-
viant Behaviour 19 (1998), 137–155.
48 Dutch ministry of housing, spatial planning and the environment, Twintig
procent afvaltransporten illegaal, VROM, 16/07/2004.
49 Porter, G., Brown, J.W. and Chasek, P., Global environmental politics, 3rd
ed., Boulder, Westview Press, 2000, 107.
50 Toffel, M.W., The growing strategic importance of end-of-life product man-
agement, California Management Review 45 (2003), no. 3, 102–129.
51 Lisney, R., Riley, K. and Banks, C., From waste to resource management,
Management services 47 (2003), no.12, 8–14.
52 Paul, K., Exporting responsibility: shipbreaking in South Asia: international
trade in hazardous waste, Environmental Policy and Law 34 (2004), 73–78.
53 Situ, Y. and Emmons, D., Environmental crime: the criminal justice system’s
role in protecting the environment, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2000, 69–82.
54 Gobert, J. and Punch, M., Rethinking corporate crime, London, Butterworths,
2003, 27–28.
55 Di Lello Finely, G., Crime envirionnemental organisé: l’exemple de l’Italie,
in: Environmental Crime in Europe: rules of sanctions, Comte, F. and Krämer, L.,
eds, Groningen, Europa law publishing, 2004, 103–109.
56 Massari, M. and Monzini, P., Dirty businesses in Italy: a case-study of illegal
trafficking in hazardous waste, Global Crime 6 (2004), 285–304.
57 Senior, K. and Mazza, A., Italian “triangle of death” linked to waste crisis,
Lancet Oncology 5 (2004), 525–527.
58 Brack, D., Combating international environmental crime, Global Environ-
mental Change: Human and Policy Dimensions 12 (2002), 144.
59 Gilbert, M.J. and Russel, S., Globalisation of criminal justice in the corporate
context, Crime Law and Social Change 38 (2002), 213.
60 Porter, G., Brown, J.W. and Chasek, P., Global environmental politics, 3rd
ed., Boulder, Westview Press, 2000, 10.
Courtesy: SZ
